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Article

OUR BOGGLING CONSTITUTION; OR,
TAKING TEXT REALLY, REALLY
SERIOUSLY

ANONYMOUS*

INTRODUCTION
Textualism is at a dead end.1
*
The author is a constitutional law expert at a top American law school. This
may not narrow things down much, since every law school calls itself a top law school and
every law professor considers himself or herself a constitutional law expert. If it helps,
the author did not graduate from Yale Law School, which brings the number of
suspected authors down to the single digits. Of course, if my name does get out, let me
hasten to say that any offense to any authors cited herein, living or dead-especially
living!-is strictly unintended.
Inspiration for the title of this piece is taken from the "Our [Your Word Here]
Constitution" series of law review articles and books. See, e.g. , Steven D. Smith, Our
Agnostic Constitution, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120 (2008); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR
IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE
THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006); ADAM TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN
CONSTITUTION (2005) (an English ringer, arguing, with no little irony, that the British
constitution is republican, despite the fact that England is not a republic and lacks a
constitution); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian
Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703 (2002); Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution:
Geographical Variations of Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77
TEX L. REV. 1129 (1999); Daniel A. Farber, Our (Almost) Imperfect Constitution, 12
CONST. COMMENT. 163 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A
Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281 (1987); Book Note, Our Obsolete Constitution,
46 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1983) (author unknown, but given the title it is a sure bet he or
she has been teaching constitutional law for the last quarter-century); Henry P.
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981) . These works are not
to be confused with the "Our" series in literature, see, e.g. , CHARLES DICKENS, OUR
MUTUAL FRIEND (1864); GRAHAM GREENE, OUR MAN IN HAVANA (1958); theater,
see, e. g. ,THORNTON WILDER, OUR TOWN (1938); TOM TAYLOR, OUR AMERICAN
COUSIN (1858) (now best remembered for the question, "Apart from that, Mrs. Lincoln,
how did you enjoy the play?"), or radio and television, see, e.g., Our Miss Brooks (CBS
radio broadcast 1948-57, CBS television broadcast 1952-56); OUR GANG (short films
syndicated for television in the 1950s as The Little Rascals), all of which share an opening
pronoun with the legal sub-genre of "Our" studies, but are vastly more entertaining.
1. This helps distinguish it from its cousin, originalism, which is merely at a dead
hand. See, e.g. , Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional
.
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I do not mean this methodologically or normatively. Those
are mere trifles. I mean that textualism is at a dead end
professionally.
It had a good run, to be sure. If you got in on the ground
floor, you might even have managed to leverage lifetime tenure
on the Supreme Court out of it. But not anymore. A good
product needs differentiation and distinctness, and good (well,
famous) academics need the same thing. Which means that if
"we are all textualists now,"2 we are also all, academically
speaking, in serious trouble.
I am not the first person to notice this, of course. Some ten
years ago, an obscure scholar named Akhil Reed Amar made
the same observation. Like any up-and-coming young man with
a name to make for himself, however, he did something about it.
One can just imagine him, glowering over a beer at Mory's,
struck both by the fact that the textualism field was now so full
of entries that anything new was unlikely to attract attention and
by the fact that he was running out of provisions of the Bill of
Rights to reinterpret. He was not going to take this lying downalthough, with another beer or two, he might take it in
something less than an upright position.
Happily, Amar had an insight. In Yale-speak, it went
something like this:
Interpreters squeeze meaning from the Constitution through a
variety of techniques-by parsing the text of a given clause, by
mining the Constitution's history, by deducing entailments of
the institutional structure it outlines, by weighing the
practicalities of proposed readings of it, by appealing to judicial
cases decided under it, and by invoking the American ideals it
embraces. Each of these classic techniques extracts meaning
from some significant feature of the Constitution-its
organization into distinct and carefully worded clauses, its
embedment in history, its attention to institutional architecture,
its plain aim to make good sense in the real world, its provision
for judicial review (and thus judicial doctrine), and its effort to
embody the ethos of the American people. Here is another
feature of the Constitution: various words and phrases recur in

Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008).
2. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative
Law, 78 B .U. L. REV. 1023, 1057 (1998) ("In a significant sense, we are all textualists
now."); Hon. Marjorie 0. Rendell, 2003-A Year of Discovery: Cybergenics and Plain
Meaning in Bankruptcy Cases, 49 VILL. L. REV. 887, 887 (2004) ("We are all textualists
now."); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 43
(2006) (ditto).
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the document. This feature gives interpreters yet another set of
clues as they search for constitutional meaning and gives rise to
3
yet another rich technique of constitutional interpretation.

In plain English, Amar's point was as follows: "Heyyy . . . If some
text is good, then lots of text must be great! "
Thus was born intratextualism, a theory of constitutional
interpretation in which "the interpreter tries to read a contested
word or phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of another
passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar)
word or phrase."4
To be sure, the argument that more must be better than some,
that intratextualism must be to textualism as two scoops of
chocolate ice cream are to one scoop of chocolate ice cream, has its
problems. It is, some might say, further evidence that folks in New
Haven have not been exposed to certain realities-like, say, basic
logic. Nevertheless, intratextualism promised to do what we expect
of new theories of constitutional interpretation: provide fame for its
inventor and a full employment program for its devotees. We could
all easily have wrung a decade or more of new work out of it,
instead of its actual measly yield of one Harvard Law Review
Foreword5 and a Comment in that journal's annual Supreme Court
issue.6
Unfortunately, there were spoilers. Recognizing that
textualism had a pretty nice thing going, and that intratextualism
would muscle in on this action and, what is worse, require
textualists to-well, to read the text-swift action was taken.
Meetings were held at the Federalist Society; Grover Norquist got
involved; and before long, marching orders had been dispatched.
Actually, by accident two sets of orders were sent out. But a
compromise was reached, and within a year Adrian Vermeule and
Ernest A. Young took together to the pages of the same Harvard
Law Review in which Intratextualism had appeared, in an attempt
to strangle the infant in its cradle.
•

3. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 1 1 2 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999). As a
side note, after the first two sentences in this passage, the editors of the Harvard Law
Review punished Amar by prohibiting him from using the words "by" or "its" for the
remainder of the article.
4. Id.
5. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 26 (2000).
6. See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 145 (2008).
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Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with
Intratextualism7 developed at some length a fundamental critique of
intratextualism. The trouble with it, in short, was that it was too
much trouble. It was like textualism with homework. Vermeule and
Young's article was rich, persuasive, carefully argued, and blah blah
blah. Really, Amar was a goner once you read the title of Vermeule
and Young's article. Those whom the gods would destroy they first
call "Herbert." It was impossible for anyone to take intratextualism
seriously again, since every obligatory "But see" footnote would
have the name "Herbert" in it. It was a cruel blow-you will
doubtless be shocked to hear that one of the authors was teaching
at Chicago at the time-but an effective one. Intratextualism was
declared dead on arrival, consigned to a landmark on the roads not
taken in constitutional theory: Intratextualism-ville, population
one.
Despite the abortive status of intratextualism, however, one
must give Amar his due. He was right: professionally speaking,
textualism has all the sparkle and vitality (although less gold
lame) of a Sunday matinee performance by Siegfried and Roy.
The Constitution is a spare document of some 8000 words,
including the amendments. To add insult to injury, some 180 of
those words are made up of signatures, which, let's face it,
doesn't help much.8 Even if you include some of the
"presupposition[s] "9 or "fundamental postulates implicit in the
constitutional design"10 - i.e., "made-up stuff," like the bit where
the Eleventh Amendment applies to actions against states
brought in state courts,11 federal administrative proceedings,1 2
and afternoon television court shows like Judge Judy13-there's
still not a hell of a lot of meat on that body, and most of it has
been picked over.
There are a few possible responses to this dilemma. Some
have turned to obscure provisions of the Constitution as new
grist for the textualist mill-lesser passages of little importance
7. Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The
Trouble with Intratextualism, 1 1 3 HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000).
8. But see Michael Coenen, Note, The Significance of Signatures: Why the Framers
Signed the Constitution and What They Meant by Doing So, 119 YALE L.J. 966 (2010).
9. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
10. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999).
1 1 . See id.
12. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
13. See, e.g. , John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 1 13 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004) (out-textualism-izing his former boss,
Justice Scalia).
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with little likelihood of drawing significant public attention, like
the Letters of Marque and Reprisal Clause, or the Second
Amendment. But at the rate that law schools (or Yale, anyway)
are churning out professors, this can't be an effective lon,p-term
strategy; we will run out of unnoticed clauses all too soon.1
Others have turned to new models of textualism and its
cousin, originalism. Jack Balkin, for example (another Yalie!
What is it with that place?), has argued at length for a theory of
textualism and originalism under which "constitutional
interpretation requires fidelity to the original meaning of the
Constitution and to the principles that underlie the text."15 This
theory has the tempting virtue of being, on closer examination,
neither originalist nor textualist. But it has failed to persuade so
far. (If you doubt me on that, consider that the article setting out
this theory is over 60 pages long, while the article attempting to
rebut critics of the theory is over 100 pages long.16 In this
business, we call that a rough start.)17
Still others-well, one person18-have taken a different
route, arguing that " [m ]uch of the Constitution,.. . including
some of [its] most important parts, is invisible."19 Apart from the
fact that any constitutional theory that has Justice Kennedy as its
intellectual godfather is starting at a disadvantage, the "invisible
Constitution" theory also has one minor problem: it is difficult to
engage in textualist analysis of a text that you can't see. Finally,
many have rejected textualism altogether. However, rejecting
textualism is also rather passe these days. It might win you an
invitation to the next American Constitution Society convention,
but you won't even get a free drink coupon.
A new approach is needed. Amar did his best with
intratextualism, but the deadly "Herbert" label, and the
unfortunate fact that people actually read the article, meant that
he failed to fly under the radar long enough to entrench it. No,
14. Statistical analysis in fact suggests that, at current rates, within 15 years there
will be more law professors than there are law students. This suits most law professors
just fine, but presents an unsustainable financial model.
15. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 , 293
(2007).
16. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007).
17. Nor does it help if someone calls your theory "disgusting." See Andrew
Koppelman, Why Jack Balkin is Disgusting, 27 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2010).
18. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008).
19. Kermit Roosevelt III, The Indivisible Constitution, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 321 ,
321 (2008).

656

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 26:651

what is needed is a new form of textualism, one that is radical
enough to make the reputation of its sole creator, 20 but whose
author is still, oddly, not as famous as the claims of justice and
merit demand, and who thus stands a chance of slipping by the
fuddy-duddies at the Federalist Society . I am that person, and
this is my crazy theory.2 1
As we have seen, Amar's intratexualism theory asks, if a
little bit of textualism is going to light everyone's fire and get
people appointed to the Supreme Court, how about even more?
He asks whether we might all get a professional bump by taking
the constitutional text really seriously.22 The next step should be
obvious: What would happen if we treated the constitutional text
really, really seriously?
The implications of this approach, as I will show, are
Boggling. Literally. I propose to Boggle both the Constitution
and . . . your mind.
Everyone is, I hope, familiar with the family word game
Boggle. Players are confronted with a box forming a four-by
four grid in which sixteen dice, each with letters on its sides, are
contained. The box is shaken, and players have three minutes to
come up with as many words as they can that be constructed by
looking among horizontally, vertically, or diagonally neighboring
letters. Hilarity (and fisticuffs, depending on the intensity and
alcoholicity of the participants) invariably ensues.23 Boggle, for
those who either prefer variants or wish to avoid copyright
violation claims when designing iPhone apps and Facebook
games, is just as one of a family of games involving word
scrambles, anagrams, and similarly deliriously exciting play.
Our Boggling Constitution-or, if you prefer, intra-intra
textualism, or intra-textualism 2.024-is what happens when text
20. Not, of course, if he remains anonymous. Or even Anonymous. But I'm keeping
my options open here. If this pans out, I can always claim authorship later, under my
actual name. If not, I'll be the first one to sign the public letter of complaint to the
journal for publishing this tripe.
21. Cf ANIMAL HOUSE (Universal Pictures 1978) ("[Otter:] I think this situation
requires a really futile and stupid gesture be done on somebody's part." "[Bluto:] We're
just the guys to do it.").
22. See William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism,
Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar's Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487 (2007);
cf Jordan Steiker, Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Taking Text and Structure Really
Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 237 (1995) .
23. See, for a totally authoritative and not a t all unreliable source, Wikipedia,
Boggle, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boggle/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
24. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2002) (making arguments about the
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is taken really, really seriously-so seriously, in fact, that we stop
taking the text seriously and start caring about the letters. It
posits that our Founders did not just deed to us a Constitution in
the form of words and phrases,· but a whole exciting grab bag of
consonants and vowels (and the letter y, which swings both
ways).
If, the theory goes, all of the words in our Constitution are
thick with authoritative interpretive meaning, then we would be
even better off if we take that meaning, jumble it all together, hit
the timer, and reach for our number two pencils. After all, if the
words are authoritative sources of meaning, surely the letters are
too! And given the ancient status of the Constitution, which was
written in an age in which neither aeronautics nor thermal
imaging searches, let alone smooth jazz or medical marijuana
(although there was a reason why all the Founders grew hemp),
were even conceivable, surely a Boggling Constitution would
give us the interpretive leg-room we need to confront modern
problems, in a way that is not only conducive to sound policy
making and the proper allocation of authority among a diverse
set of post-Weberian governing institutions, but also fun for the
whole family. In short, I want to argue in this Article that We the
People might benefit from rethinking our basic sources of
constitutional commitment and taking our reformed and
reconstituted place as Elope He Wept-or, for the more daring,
Pee Hep Towel.
Part I of this Articfle lays out the theory of Our Boggling
Constitution in painful detail. Part II examines some of the
arguments for and against the theoretical legitimacy and
pragmatic value of my intra-intra-textualist approach to
constitutional meaning in-for reasons that are no more
apparent to me than to you-the form of a dialogue. Part III
presents some puzzles of constitutional meaning that might be
asked or answered-or even asked and answered, if no one
objects-by a Boggling approach to the Constitution. The
Conclusion briefly, mercifully, and tautologically, concludes.

status of democracy and free speech in the Internet age); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2007) (adding a digit to the title and a single footnote reference to
Friendster in the text and then reselling the original book at another $20 a pop). And
people ask how he can be so prolific!
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I. . . . THEN YOU SHAKE IT ALL ABOUT
Recall the basic insight of Amar's intratexutalism: more is,
um, better.25 If we like a little bit of textualism, we should enjoy a
whole lot of it even more. Thus, we should reject "clause-bound
textualism," which does nutty things like "read[ing] the words of
the Constitution in order, tracking the sequence of clauses as
they appear in the document itself." 26 This approach leads to all
kinds of embarrassments, like coherence and political
conservatism.
Worse, it is dull. Hey, we're among friends, right? So we can
admit that the Constitution is, in a word, boring. Hell, it's dry as
dirt. It is so dull that, when constitutional theorists started
reading Lacan and Wittgenstein in the 1980s, they did so because
they thought the writing was better. If we had picked a more
exciting subject to teach and write about than constitutional law,
we might have a more enjoyable text to spend our time with
say, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act of
1947. But, as of this writing, there is no Southmayd Chair of
Fungicides at Yale. We might have become literary critics
instead, and spent our time reading novels. But Stanley Fish had
already sucked the life out of that field before trying to muscle in
on ours, and anyways the pay is worse in English departments.
Face it: the Constitution is our field, and we are stuck with it.
But, Amar argues, we might at least have more fun with it if we
tried reading the words out of sequence.
By arguing for an intratextualist approach that "reads the
words of the Constitution in a dramatically different order," 27
Amar is not arguing that we should scramble the order of
particular clauses. (See "clause-bound textualism, ridiculing of.")
That approach might be entertaining, but can lead to absurd
results. For instance, we might read Article I, Section 2, clause 2,
to say "No person shall be a Representative who shall have
attained to the age of seven years. . . . " This would lead to a
bunch of squalling infants serving in the House. (Which, actually,
does roughly describe the House of Representatives.) Or we
25. But see CECILE ANDREWS & WANDA URBANSKA, LESS IS MORE: EMBRACING
SIMPLICITY FOR A HEALTHY PLANET, A CARING ECONOMY AND LASTING HAPPINESS
(2009) ; E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE
MATTERED ( 1973 ) . On the other hand, see THE ANDREA TRUE CONNECTION, More,
More, More, on MORE, MORE, MORE (Buddah Records 1976) ; see also id. ( "How do you
like it?").
26. Amar, supra note 3, at 788.
27. Id. at 789.
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might read the presidential oath of office out of sequence, which
under our current constitutional system is unlikely to occur.
(Okay, bad example.)
Instead, intratextualism demands that the Constitution be
read out of sequence in a broad, big-thinking kind of way. For
instance, we would read the provisions of the Fifteenth,
Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, all
of which use "the same highly elaborate set of words, 'the right
of citizens of the United States . . . to vote,"' "in pari materia. " 28
Or, to take a now-aging example, in trying to make sense of the
"inferior officer" language in the Appointments Clause of
Article II, section 2, we would turn to other uses of the word
"inferior" in the Constitution to answer the question, "To whom
exactly is [Independent] Counsel [Kenneth] Starr 'inferior'?" 29
Or we might focus more specifically on particular word choices,
noting, for example, that "In the Constitution, ... 'the United
States' is consistently a plural noun."30
All of this is to the good. From a Coverian perspective,
intratextualism is a decidedly jurisgenerative project.31 Once we
are liberated from our "clause-bound" prisons, and focused
instead on the question "What are words for?, "32 we can get a lot
more life out of the old grey mare. Playing with words,
combinations of words, and recurring words and phrases
multiplies arithmetically33 the possibilities for constitutional
interpretation, in a way that can reach up to, if not beyond,
tenure. It can generate new ideas, new interpretive modalities,
new conference invitations. And because it's constitutional
28. Id. See someone who knows Latin.
29. Id. at 748. This is, incidentally, a trick question. The answer to the question "To
whom is Kenneth Starr inferior" is, "Everyone. "
30. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 5 1 4 U.S. 779, 846 n . 1 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 29
(2005). But see Treanor, supra note 22, at 489 (pointing out that, "in the late eighteenth
century, nouns ending in the letters were commonly assigned plural verbs, regardless of
whether or not the noun itself was plural."). This kind of killjoy focus on trivialities like
accuracy and context is why law faculties should avoid hiring too many actual historians.
We can get along just fine with Bruce Ackerman instead, thank you.
31. See generally Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4 ( 1983). "Jurisgenerative" is a compound term meaning, "Tending to generate
more jurists." Admittedly, no one is sure what the rest of Cover's article means, but that
has not stopped it from being cited in the Supreme Court, albeit by Justice Brennan, who
went in for that sort of thing. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 n.3 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
32. See MISSING PERSONS, Words, on SPRING SESSION M (Capitol Records1982).
33. Or geometrically-I'm not sure which. If I was good with numbers, I would
have gone to medical school.
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scholarship, it is unlikely to do anyone in the real world any
harm.
Amar concedes, more than 50 pages into his Intratextualism
article, that, if " [c]arried to extremes, intratextualism may lead
to readings that are too clever by half-cabalistic overreadings
conjuring up patterns that were not specifically intended and
that are upon deep [sic] reflection not truly sound but merely
cute."34 Talk about burying the lead! He thus asks,
"Intratextualism helps us see clearly a possibly attractive reading
[of the Constitution]-it leads us to water. But should we
drink?"35 (It should be noted that the reference to drinking tends
to confirm my theory that the whole thing was cooked up over
beers at Mory's.) In any event, Amar concludes that if
undertaken carefully and sensitively, if used in the right hands
say, those of a certain Southmayd Professor of Law
intratextualism offers unlimited promise as a method of
constitutional interpretation.
Amar goes wrong in two places, however. The first error is
his suggestion that "extremes," "cabalistic overreadings," and
readings of the Constitution that are "not truly sound but merely
cute" are a bad thing. In a fairly typical Yale dig at Harvard,36 he
writes: "As illustrated most vividly by [Christopher] Langdell,
intratextualism can become a mechanical exercise that blunts
good judgment and leads to outlandish outcomes."37
To be sure, if Amar is right about this, intratextualism
would be indistinguishable from textualism, whose very purpose
is to provide mechanical exercises that blunt good judgment and
ensure outlandish outcomes. Still, any attempt to cast doubt on a
theory of constitutional interpretation just because it might be
fanciful and useless begs the impatient response: "Okay. And
that is a bad thing because?" After all, as Chief Justice John
Marshall famously wrote, " [W]e must never forget it is a
constitution we are expounding. "38 Which is another way of
saying, it's not like we're cardiologists, auto mechanics, or
something important. Our livelihood as constitutional theorists
does not depend on being "sound," or "right," or "not crazy." To
the contrary: if we want to keep this great gig going, we need all
34. Amar, supra note 3, at 799.
35. Id. at 807.
36. And in the Harvard Law Review, no less! Presumably the student editors had
stopped reading by this point and didn't notice the insult.
37. Amar, supra note 3, at 799.
38. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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the cabalistic overreadings and outlandish outcomes we can get.
When you start running out of unsupportable and borderline
insane readings of the Constitution, you might as well abandon
your constitutional law treatise and call it a day.39
Second, as Vermeule and Young point out ad nauseam,
intratextualism is hard work. Really, really hard. "Clause-bound
textualists" at least have the luxury of only having to read the
Constitution one clause at a time. This eliminates the need to
read the whole thing in context, and allows readers who are
pressed for time to skip over most of the unimportant words, like
"a," "the," and "well regulated militia." Intratextualists, by
contrast, have to read every damn word of the document, often
more than once. Which brings us back to the core problem: the
Constitution is just not a fun read.
This point is important not just because, as a general rule, it
is better to do fun things than not-fun things. It also raises
questions of legitimacy. Americans, who need instructions to
operate a toothpick and think Thomas Jefferson is that fellow
who moved on up to the East Side to a deluxe apartment in the
sky, are in no position to read the entire Constitution, whether
word by word or clause by clause.40 Even seasoned professionals
will find it rough sledding, and may find it difficult to ascertain
the most basic facts, like whether the President is supposed to be
selected by the people, the Electoral College, or a slim majority
of the Supreme Court. We Americans are, not to put too fine a
point on it, barely qualified to elect the winner on American
Idol, let alone interpret the Constitution.
The difficult and demanding nature of intratextualism as an
interpretive method thus raises serious questions of democratic
legitimacy. What kind of Constitution would we have-indeed,
what sort of system of government would we have-if
constitutional interpretation were so difficult that it became the
rarefied province of just a few unrepresentative graduates of
elite law schools?

39. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291 (2005)
(discussing Tribe's decision to abandon further work on the second volume of the third
edition of his magisterial constitutional law treatise). At the end of the second volume,
Tribe would have revealed who the murderer was, and the hero and heroine would have
been reunited and lived happily ever after.
40. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty:
A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV.
1287 (2004).
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Okay, forget I asked that question. Still, a number of
constitutional scholars have made a similar point in different
ways. They have advocated "taking the Constitution away from
the courts,"41 or "popular constitutionalism,"42 as a means of
restoring some of the democratic luster of the Constitution.
True, they will abandon those theories once liberals again
constitute a majority on the Supreme Court. But until President
Obama gets a chance to do something more than just replacing
old liberals with young ones, this may be a while in coming. In
the meantime, it makes sense to search for a theory of
constitutional meaning that can be undertaken by what Kramer
would call "the people themselves"-or, as Justice Holmes calls
them, "imbeciles."43
These two points-that any theory of constitutional
interpretation should be both fun and popularly available-leads
to the question that animates this Essay: Why not a form of
constitutional interpretation that is fun for the whole family?
Enter Boggle.
Different games have their partisans qua games, to be sure.
But the question we confront here is: are there particular family
games that are also totally legitimate, not-at-all-wacko devices
for interpreting our Constitution? On this question, some games
fall short. Constitutional theory may be a trivial pursuit, for
example, but it is not Trivial Pursuit. Monopoly might have been
helpful, but mostly in interpreting the Constitution in the
nineteenth century.44 Some think the popular board game
Diplomacy might do, but memos written by the Office of Legal
Counsel in the last Administration have declared that diplomacy
has no application to constitutional interpretation or, in fact,
anything else. That pretty well leaves us with Boggle.
I have already laid out the rules of Boggle, but perhaps an
illustration would help here. (In any event, I have never had a
chart in one of my articles, and I would like to add a sense of
41. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999).
42. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). Kramer here means "popular" in
the sense of "more than nine," rather than in the Nada Surf sense.
43. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) .
44. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 17801860 (1979); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 18701960 (1994). Note that there is a ten-year gap between the two volumes, covering the
years between 1860 and 1870. Happily, nothing of note happened in American history or
law during that period.
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meaning and excitement to the otherwise drab lives of the
editors.) This is a typical Boggle board:
B

A

D

E

M

E

R

R

A

R

T

y

R

B

u

R

The object, of course, is to find as many words within this
jumble as possible, generally within a three-minute period. So,
for instance, in the illustration above one may form the words
"BAD," "ERR," "ART," "MARBURY," "RUB," and so on. I
told you this was fun!
Some variants on Boggle-also known as "ways to get
around copyright violations"-may also be helpful in our project
of limning the Boggling Constitution.45 The online game "Text
Twist," for instance, generates six-letter combinations which can
then be reordered to form different words of various lengths.46
Similarly, the iPhone-which has bettered the human condition

45. They also give rise to the possible critique that I'm really talking about these
other games, or word-scramble games in general, and not Boggle. But 1) "Our Boggling
Constitution" is a really smashing title, much better than "Our Anagrammatic
Constitution," and I'm not going to let anything stand in the way of using it, and 2) if
Amar can bury the problems with his approach, I can do the same with mine.
46. See
Text
Twist
on
Yahoo!
Games,
http://get.games.yahoo.com/
proddesc?gamekey=texttwist (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). One should be cautious about
playing this game too much, however. I once came home abuzz with the thought that
"meat," "mate," and "team" are all variations of the same letters, and was nearly thrown
out of the house by my spouse. And it turns out that most professional clergy already
know that "God" spelled backwards is "dog," and are not impressed when you point this
out to them.
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by offering about fifty different "fake lighter" applications, but
whose onerous contract terms obliging users to sign on with
AT&T for life are, ironically, in clear violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment-has dozens of word scramble games, such as
Twisty Text, TextTwist, and BoggWords. (Remember what I
said about copyright law?) Let's just agree to call the whole
megillah Boggle. If the Parker brothers have a problem with
that, they know where to find me.
Our Boggling Constitution, or intra-intra-textualism, is
simply a means of bringing this zany and educational leisure
pursuit to bear on the activity of constitutional interpretation.
Consider, for example, the Preamble to the United States
Constitution. We are all familiar with its evocative language
"in order to form a more perfect Union," "secure the Blessings
of Liberty," and so on. But the Preamble, read Boggle-style, also
tells us that the United States is a land in which "people shoot
the butts off tons of the most sweet creatures to stuff, but feel
that to require a permit is evil."47 This conclusion took Justice
Scalia and his "hapless law clerk[s] "48 endless hours of trolling
through old microfilms of colonial-era Connecticut newspaper
articles to reach in District of Columbia v. Heller,49 but could
have been reached with far greater speed, and no particular loss
of credibility, if they'd been willing to just mess around with the
words a little. The Preamble, suitably rearranged, also tells us
that "former presidents' children assume they deserve the top
job too, on no more than name,"50 which again could have saved
the Court no end of time and trouble about ten years back. And
then there is this gem, which has a certain McCulloch v.
Maryland, sea-to-shining-sea spirit to it, and also may help in
interpreting the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Columbus to Perry, Edison to Einstein, Ruth to Ryan, Reuter
to Hoffa, Disney to Spielberg: 0 honored pioneers!
Adventurous to timid, carefree to burdened, refined optimists
to crude pessimists, enfeebled to health nuts; Republicans to
Democrats, Christians to Jews; Harlem to Watts, Queens to

47. See
Anagrams
by
Richard
Grantham,
Only
in
the
U.S . . . ,
http://www.anagrammy. com/literary/rg/poems-rg6.html.
48. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 5 1 1 , 527 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Which
raises the question, is there such a thing as a hapful law clerk? And what's a hap,
anyway?
49. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
50. See Grantham, supra note 47.
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Glendale, Fifth Avenue to Main Street, Atlantic to Pacific: no
51
lie, 'tis home to the free!

And that's just the Preamble! There's lots more where that came
from, believe me.
First Amendment scholars, for instance, as well as local
businesses in Pawtucket, Rhode Island with surplus clowns they're
trying to unload,52 have long puzzled over the meaning of the
Establishment Clause. Does it prevent the state from turning us
into "insiders" and "outsiders" by endorsing particular religious
messages?53 Does it prevent us from denying "Equal Liberty" to
particular religious believers or non-believers?54 Does it mean
"absolutely nothing?"55
The meaning of the Establishment Clause is a seemingly
difficult, if not intractable, question-I hope it's intractable, since
my livelihood depends on it-but, as it turns out, it is "happily.. .
not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. "56 One need simply
stare more closely at the word "Establishment." No, more closely
than that. Closer. That's it. Now we can see that "Establishment" is
simply a fancy way of saying "A Blent Theisms." In other words,
under an intra-intra-textualist reading of the Establishment Clause,
if you just smush all theistic religious beliefs together into a
shapeless pudding of generic God-talk-a "blent theism"-you've
got no Establishment Clause violation. Which, as it turns out, is
pretty well what the Court has said anyway.57 But this approach to
51. See Anagrams by Richard Brodie, http://www.anagrammy.com/literary/
rb/poems-rb3.html.
52. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
53. See id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007) (setting out a theory of "Equal Liberty").
55. See generally Antonin Scalia.
56. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 176 ( 1803).
57. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-95 (1983); Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O 'Connor, J., concurring). This is fairly close
to Justice Scalia's view as well, although in his understanding "blent theisms" refers
exclusively to good upstanding Christian sorts of God, and not the more unsavory foreign
kinds. See, e.g. , McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 889-900 (2005)
(arguing that the Establishment Clause permits government acknowledgement of
"monotheism,'' defined as including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, but not Cthulhu
worship or Scientology, and asserting that it also permits the "disregard of polytheists
and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists
[and Democrats]"). According to Justice Scalia, ignoring atheists and agnostics, as well as
worshippers of Hinduism, Buddhism, pantheism, and the Jackson Five, leaves us with "a
broad and diverse range of the population-from Christians to Muslims." Id. at 894. This
calls to mind Dorothy Parker's review of a Katharine Hepburn performance, in which
she said Hepburn had run the gamut of emotions from A to B. See THE QUOT ABLE
WOMAN 245 (Elaine Partnow ed., 1978).
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the same reading is actually superior, because, unlike the Court's
view of ceremonial deism in Marsh v. Chambers, it kind of makes
sense.
Our Boggling Constitution reaches insights about other
aspects of our Founding document, both structural and substantive,
obscure and notorious. What does Article III mean by
"controversies," to take a relatively simple example?58 A number of
things, as it turns out, including cases involving "cons," "notes,"
"sins," and "ire," which embraces most of the criminal law and the
UCC, as well as canon law. It also, contrary to current opinion, may
include cases without genuine adverse interests (or "contrive[d]
sores"), cases involving product defects in tennis and fishing
("corrosive nets"), and disputes involving Murphy beds ("cot
reversions"). More broadly, we can see clearly the function of
Article III as a dispute-resolution mechanism that enables parties
to resolve public and private disputes without resorting to violence.
What are legally resolved controversies, after all, but "converse
riots?"
To take a more controversial example, the courts have
struggled mightily to determine the scope, contours, and
implications-oh, and also the, um, existence-of "substantive
due process." One approach to this mess has been that of Justice
Douglas: to find the content of substantive due process rights not
in the Due Process Clause itself (partly to avoid the risk of so
called Lochner-ization, and partly because people sometimes
actually read the Due Process Clause and realize it's a non
starter), but instead in "penumbras" and "emanations" from the
substantive guarantees of the Bill of Rights.59 But this approach
has generally been ridiculed. As I have learned in teaching
constitutional law, law students, as somber as they usually are,
cannot help tittering when they read the word "emanations."
(Or the word "tittering," for that matter.)
More guidance on the scope and nature of substantive due
process rights can be found, however, when we rearrange the
words, or actually the letters, of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. That section includes, in an admittedly
scrambled form, the words "abortion," "sodomy," "right to die,"
and "vibrators"-although not, interestingly, "a right of access to
58. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER &
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (6th ed. 2009) (making short work-a mere 1631 pages-of the 375 or so words
of Article III).
59. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 ( 1965).
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experimental drugs that have passed limited safety trials but
have not been proven safe and effective."60 (It does, however,
happily include both "reefer" and "salvia. ") It also includes the
letters that make up the words "green pastel redness,"
incidentally, so this Essay can stand as one more effort to refute
John Hart Ely.61
Intra-intra-textualism, in short, provides the means for
discovering new sources of meaning in the letters of our
founding document. It is less difficult than originalism, and also
less likely to result in significant library fines for overdue
eighteenth-century books. It has as much integrity as
Dworkinian method, and has the advantage of not spending half
of each year in England. It has as much capacity to find worthy
principles of constitutionalism as so-called "justice-seeking"
methods of constitutional interpretation,62 but exceeds it in its
ability to seek not only "justice," but also "ice" and "tics." And it
outdoes popular constitutionalism, because it could actually
be . . . popular. More than popular, in fact. Downright
uproarious.
II. ANONYMOUS, HERBERT, HERCULES, AMAR,
BOB, CAROL, TED AND ALICE: A DIALOGUE
Another way to explore the implications of Our Boggling
Constitution is through the form of a dialogue. The dialogic
model, in addition to holding out the hope of a screenplay or an
Off-Off-Broadway run,63 is helpful here because it makes plain
what might be obscure, clarifies what might seem complicated,
and dispels doubts where they might arise. This is why Henry

60. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en bane).
61. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980). For examples of
people lining up to give Ely a good whacking, see, for example, Mark Tushnet, Darkness
on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89
YALE L.J. 1037 (1980); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980). And that's just in the Yale Law
Journal. Apparently Ely failed to make sufficient contributions to the Yale alumni fund.
62. See, e.g. , Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the
Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. L. REV. 410 (1993); cf Lawrence G. Sager
writing as Stephen King writing as Richard Bachman, THINNER (1984).
63. This is not entirely far-fetched. The dialogue sections of Judge John T. Noonan,
Jr.'s book, NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE
STATES (2002), were actually optioned by Hollywood, although the characters were
renamed, some of the action was altered, and the movie was released under the title The
Babysitter Murders.

668

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol.26:651

Hart's famous dialogue on the federal courts is so easy to
understand.64 Or maybe not.On the other hand: screenplay!
So imagine a figure like Dworkin's Hercules, only more so:
a figure of infinite wisdom, grace, intellect, far-reaching vision,
and smashing good looks. Call this hypothetical figure
"Anonymous." His interlocutor is a less wise, more skeptical,
oddly hirsute individual wearing a thick pair of glasses. Call him,
naturally, "Herbert." Herbert is friendly but a little dim. Let us
assume he is a federal judge.
As our dialogue begins, Anonymous and Herbert have just
taken their seats in a cafe.They are sitting at a table at which the
previous occupants, who failed to bus their table and left little or
no tip, were Rodrigo and Richard Delgado,65 who were
discussing the plight of the working poor. Herbert is familiar
with the nascent theory of intra-intra-textualism, but has a few
doubts. (He also has been hiding the fact that he is having an
affair with a former law clerk and has mob ties. But John
Grisham will have to finish off that part of the story.) And ...
action!
* * * * *

Herbert: You're joking, right?
Anonymous: Not at all.
Herbert: Come on.
Anonymous: Well, yes, a little.But bear with me.
Herbert: I'll listen until my latte's done. Then I'm out of
here.

64. Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
65. See Richard Delgado, Rodridgo's Roundelay: Hernandez v. Texas and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23, 63 (2006). This cite is the
result of a thoroughly unscientific search on Westlaw of the 31 or so Rodrigo tales
published in law journals, which reveals only one reference to a tip over countless
lunches and dinners enjoyed by Delgado, Rodrigo, and friends. This consists of a
reference to Rodrigo "fishing in his pocket for some change to leave a tip,'' after tying up
a coffee shop table for several hours discussing social justice over about five bucks' worth
of coffee. Any law-and-economics scholar worth his or her salt, after totaling up the cost
of the drinks, the work involved in preparing them, the opportunity costs for occupying
the table that long, and recent regional figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
would surely have left at least a couple of bucks as a tip, not just spare change-unless
they teach at George Mason, in which case the waiter would be lucky to escape with a
stern lecture about Ayn Rand and a complimentary Ron Paul bumper sticker.
Incidentally and perhaps tellingly, the story does not say whether Rodrigo actually left a
tip for the waiter in the end or not; I'm betting he stiffed the poor sap.
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Anonymous: Fine. Now, is Our Boggling Constitution really
so ridiculous?
Herbert: Yes. Yes, it is.
Anonymous: Well, what makes it any more ridiculous than
any other theory of constitutional interpretation?
Herbert: If that's your point of comparison, you're rigging
the game. Still, surely it's more ridiculous than, say, originalism.
At least that has a theory of legitimacy behind it.
Anonymous: Which is?
Herbert: Historical pedigree, for one. Plus popular consent,
and the fact that any activity that is too difficult for non
historians to do well must be just the thing for poorly trained
lawyers.
Anonymous: Well, I think intra-intra-textualism has the first
two categories covered.
Herbert: Excuse me?
Anonymous: Look, word games have been around a long
time. People have been doing this sort of thing since the
Babylonian era.66 And they invented the ziggurat! Plus, Parker
Brothers has been around since the 1880s. On the other hand,
originalism was invented by Ed Meese.67 And he wrote his first
draft of the theory on a cocktail napkin in an airport bar at
Dulles.
Herbert: Point taken. But surely originalism's roots extend
back to the Founding era?
Anonymous: Oh, please.
Herbert: Come on. Let's be polite about this.
Anonymous: Sorry. Sip your latte; it's getting cold.68
Anyway, while no one really knows what the Founders thought
about originalism,69 we know what they thought about Our
Boggling Constitution. Kind of.
66. See TONY AUGARDE, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO WORD GAMES 1 (2d ed. 2003).
67. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987).
68. This is the kind of dramatic detail that gives the Rodrigo stories their incredible
verisimilitude.
69. Compare H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985), with Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988) (reprinting Powell's original article-in a
much more prestigious journal! -but adding a question mark to the title). See also
Robert G. Natelson, The Founders' Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007) (reprinting both Powell and Lofgren, but
with a new cite to Gadamer).
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Herbert: This should be good.
Anonymous: Consider this. In a letter to the delegates of
Congress on January 20, 1786, Charles Pettit writes that while
some Commissioners "have Resolution enough to exercise this
Discretionary Power so as to let few Obstacles impede their
Progress," others, "more timid, or less inclined to dispatch the
Business, bo�gle at many Things which the former pass pretty
easily over."7
Herbert: Who is Charles Pettit? And what the hell was he
talking about?
Anonymous: I have no idea.
Herbert: Hmm . . . .
Anonymous: Okay, take another example. George
Washington, writing to Benjamin Harrison on May 5-7, 1779 the middle of the Revolutionary War, no less-wrote: "Little did
I expect when I begun this letter that I should have spun it out to
this length or that I should have run into such freedom of
sentiment; but I have been led on insensibly and therefore shall
not boggle at the mention of thing more which I am desirous to
touch upon."71
Herbert: Urn, he said "shall not boggle."
Anonymous: But he could have! He wanted to boggle, and
would have if he hadn't been insensible at the moment. And,
you know-he was just the father of our country, for Pete's sake.
Herbert: They did have pretty strong mead in those days; a
lot of the Founders were probably half-"insensible" most of the
time.
Anonymous: And here's another one. Josiah Bartlett
another American President -wrote to William Whipple on
December 31, 1776, to discuss the question of bounties with
respect to the Revolutionary War, and said that "the proposal of
giving lands as a part of the bounty has boggled us, however it
will be got over in a few days I believe, and sent forward. "72
70. See Letter from Charles Pettit to Nathanael Greene (Jan. 20, 1786) (emphasis
added),
available
at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field
(DOCID+@lit(dg02389)) (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
71. See Letter from George Washington to Benjamin Harrison (May 5-7, 1779)
(emphasis
added),
available
at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/
mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw150015)) (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
72. See Letter of Josiah Bartlett to William Whipple (Dec. 31, 1776) (emphasis
added), available at http://memory.loc.gov/amem/hlawquery.html (search "Bartlett
boggled"; then follow the first link).
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Herbert: Josiah Bartlett wasn't the President!
Anonymous: Sure he was! He was even re-elected despite
having lied about having multiple sclerosis, and even though he
was incredibly literate and eloquent.
Herbert: That's The West Wing. It was fictional. Plus that
Bartlett didn't become President until the twentieth century.
Anonymous: The West Wing was fictional? That explains a
lot. I didn't think the American people would elect someone
who was so articulate.73
Herbert: Okay, okay. Let's just put us both out of our
misery and assume that the Founders would have enjoyed
Boggling the Constitution. What does that prove?
Anonymous: Not much. I mean, if I went running off to the
Founders for advice every time I had a pressing concern, I would
be treating my arthritis with leeches and trying to cast the
demons out of my television set. But it does suggest that Our
Boggling Constitution has a historical pedigree that's at least as
strong as anything Leonard Leo can offer.
Herbert: Okay. But what about popular consent? At least
the state ratifying conventions agreed to the particular language
of the Constitution.
Anonymous: Except for when Congress forced a bunch of
states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.
Herbert: Well, yeah. Still, the original ratifying conventions
agreed to the language, right? Except for the slaves, women, and
Indians.
Anonymous: Right.
Herbert: Right?
Anonymous: Exactly.
Herbert: Exactly? What kind of answer is that?
Anonymous: They agreed to the language of the
Constitution. All of it.
Herbert: And?
Anonymous: Doesn't that include the letters?
73. But see Xuan Thai & Ted Barrett, Biden's Description of Obama Draws
Scrutiny, CNN.COM, Feb. 9, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/Ol/31/biden.
obama/ (recounting the controversy over then-Senator and presidential candidate Joe
Biden's description of fellow Senator and presidential candidate Barack Obama as "the
first mainstream African-American who is articulate and bright and clean and a nice
looking guy" ) . Obama later punished Biden by forcing him to serve as Vice-President.
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Herbert: Grr.
Anonymous: Well, they did. They even capitalized a bunch
of them.
Herbert: Yeah, I never understood that.
Anonymous: Me neither. But do you think it's really a
coincidence that if you take just the capital letters contained in
Article I, Section two, Clause three of the Constitution, which
discusses the division of the members of the Senate into classes
for purposes of holding elections for one third of the Senate
every two years, you get the words "A Cyclic Secrecy?"
Herbert: Well, in fact, I doAnonymous: Exactly. It can't be a coincidence.
Herbert: That's not what I wasAnonymous: Or that it contains the name "Claeys?"74
Herbert: Okay, that one's cool. But so what?
Anonymous: The point is that the whole Constitution is
pregnant with meaning.
Herbert: [Titters.]
Anonymous: Grow up. And that meaning goes all the way
down, right to the letters. Rearranged, the Constitution gives us
countless clues to its meaning. It's like some kind of fractal
arrangement.
Herbert: What are fractals again?
Anonymous: Well, they're . . . They involve . . . A fractal
is . . . Never mind. Just trust me on this one.
Herbert: Fine. But how does that get us to popular consent?
Even if they agreed to all the letters, they couldn't have agreed
to all the combinations of letters.
Anonymous: Well, that depends on what you mean by
"popular." That's something most lawyers don't really know
much about. Most of the time, when we talk about "popular"
consent to the Constitution, we don't mean "popular" in the
sense of "popularly agreed to," right? We mean something like,
"agreed to by a few elite individuals who showed up for the
ratifying conventions." And half of those people only showed up
because they were offered a free three-day stay at a vacation

74. See Faculty Web Page for Constitutional Law Professor Eric R. Claeys,
http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/claeys_eric (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
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resort, on the condition that they attend a ratifying convention
and sit through a short sales talk on time-shares first.
Herbert: What?
Anonymous: Right. So once we're operating at that level of
fiction about consent,75 is it really any more ludicrous to say
there was "popular" consent to Our Boggling Constitution?
Herbert: I guess. What's the other meaning of "popular"
you had in mind?
Anonymous: Do you like interpreting the Impairment of
Contracts Clause?
Herbert: I'm a federal judge. I don't interpret the
Impairment of Contracts Clause.
Anonymous: Well, how about the Commerce Clause, then.
Herbert: I wouldn't really call it "interpreting," actually.
More like "rubber-stamping it unless violence against women is
involved."
Anonymous: Well, is there anything in the Constitution you
do interpret?
Herbert: Not if I can help it. Do you know what salaries for
federal judges are like these days?
Anonymous: Well, do you like reading the thing?
Herbert: Again, I'm a federal judge. If I need to know
what's in it, which I don't, I ask a law clerk to look it up. You
teach constitutional law. Do you or your students read the
Constitution?
[Both laugh. An awkward silence follows.]
Anonymous: Um, as I was saying. Interpreting the
Constitution isn't really a popular activity. It's actually kind of
tedious.
Herbert: You said it, brother.
Anonymous: Boggle, on the other hand, is wicked fun. If
you had to interpret the Contracts Clause, wouldn't it be more
fun if you could figure out all the words hidden within it? Like
"tracts," "imps," or "rim snot?"
Herbert: True. Although I'm not sure "rim snot" is too
helpful.

75. See, e.g. , Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can
Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482 (1985).
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Anonymous: Plus it's not only fun-it's fun for the whole
family. Did you know that Boggle is suitable for ages "8 to
Adult?"76 If we really want a Constitution that is open to reading
and interpretation for everyone, that can truly engage the whole
community of citizens, isn't this the way to go?
Herbert: Sure, but you can't even vote if you're under 18.
Anonymous: Yeah, but the Constitution-read in an un
Boggling fashion, that is-only has age limits for members of the
executive and legislative branches, not the judicial branch. An
eight-year-old might not be able to serve in Congress or the
Presidency, but she could at least sit on the Supreme Court or
the lower federal courts, at least if she can get a note from her
parents.
Herbert: Okay, I'm coming around a little. Intra-intra
textualism does sound like a lot more fun than the usual kinds of
constitutional interpretation. And I'd save a hell of a lot on labor
costs if I could have children serving as my law clerks. I might
even be able to find summer work for my son. Fourteen years
old and doesn't even get out of bed until after noon! But I have
to say, the whole thing still sounds a little meshuggenah. Do you
folks in the academy really get paid for this sort of thing?
Anonymous: We do until tenure, anyway. After that, we
don't even have to write. But if you want to advance in
constitutional theory, this is exactly the kind of thing we're
looking for. I mean, come on-it's brilliant!
Herbert: "Brilliant," huh? Don't suffer from self-doubt
much, do you? Didn't one of you fellas knock "brilliant"
constitutional theories a while back?
Anonymous: Sure-Daniel Farber.77 He argued that
"brilliant scholarship [had] recently become rampant" in
constitutional law, that brilliant theories of constitutional law
"by definition . . . would not occur to most people," and that
since these kinds of theories "can only be brilliant because [they
are] actually false," we should instead focus on more
"pedestrian" approaches to the field.78

76. See Hasbro, BOGGLE Game, http://www.hasbro.com/objects/products/print.
cfm?product_id=9619.
77. See Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986);
Daniel A. Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1988).
78. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, supra note 77, at 924, 925, 929. To say that
brilliant theories have ever been rampant in constitutional law seems to be stretching it a
little, but the piece was cite-checked by a 24-year-old law student, so it must be true.
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Herbert: So what do you say to that?
Anonymous: He didn't mean it.
Herbert: What?
Anonymous: Look, complaining about "brilliance" is itself a
brilliant move. I mean, the article has been cited over 120
times-or about 12, when you discount for self-citation.79 If that's
not a self-refuting move, I don't know what is.
Herbert: True.
Anonymous: Plus, haven't you ever heard of pulling the
ladder up after you've climbed it yourself?80 I'm pretty sure
that's what Farber was doing. Try being "brilliant" after that!
Farber would be ready to cite his own article at you before the
ink was dry on your new theory.
Herbert: Sneaky devil, isn't he?
Anonymous: Trust me-brilliance still sells in constitutional
theory. People can talk all they like about how boring legal
scholarship has gotten,81 but a really outlandish theory of
constitutional interpretation is still going to pack 'em in.
Herbert: Or a really stupid one.
Anonymous: Tomayto, tomahto.
* * * * *

And . . . scene!
III. A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR BOGGLING
CONSTITUTIONALISM; OR, I'M BUSY-YOU DO IT
By now, it should be utterly clear that Our Boggling
Constitution is more than a mere fantasy, jest, or really bad idea.
(Or not. The difference between serious constitutional theory
79. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence
People, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 843 ( 1996 ) .
80. See HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK; OR, THE WHALE 34 ( Oxford University
Press 2008) ( 1851 ) . See also the general phenomenon of law professors achieving tenure
and then complaining that tenure standards aren't strict enough.
81. See, e.g. , Daniel R. Ortiz, Nice Legal Studies 1-2 ( Va. Pub. Law and Legal
Theory Research Paper No. 2009-12, 2009 ) , available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474402
( complaining that kids these days don't know what it was like to do legal theory back
when Ortiz was younger) . For a grander, more eloquent statement along these lines, see
Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1528 ( 1997 )
( calling ours a "generation of midgets" that, among other sins, refuses to concede that
the Constitution can be legitimately amended outside the confines of Article V through a
process of iterated approval by Congress, the Supreme Court, Professor Ackerman, and
the starting lineup of the New York Mets) .
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and outright parody is, after all, about as thin as the difference
between Coke and Coke Classic. If there's a point to this
Article-and that's a big "if" -that may be it.82) It is a living,
breathing, occasionally dancing and singing reality. By looking at
the Constitution at an atomic level, by breaking through the
tyranny of words and sentences constructed in what they would
like you to think is a coherent and purposive manner, and seeing
instead the glorious and protean letters that are the final source
of constitutional legitimacy, we open up new vistas of
constitutional meaning-and, more importantly, professional
opportunities for constitutional interpreters. We're sitting on a
gold mine here, people!
That being said, one should concede that Our Boggling
Constitution raises as many questions as it answers, or possibly
slightly more. Or maybe a lot more. A skeptic might say that
intra-intra-textualism raises serious doubts and concerns about
little things like credibility, legitimacy, and application. That's
what a skeptic would say, anyway. A constitutional scholar
would call the same thing "a fertile and promising theory."
Clearly, I can't do all the work. It wouldn't be fair. Plus, my
laptop battery is running down, and I'm starting to get dirty
looks from the manager of this Starbucks for sitting here too
long without buying anything. So let me suggest some questions
that might form the foundation for future work on Our Boggling
Constitution and its implications.
Congress. Article I, section one of the Constitution says that
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States," which shall consist of a "Senate"
and House of "Representatives." But is the legislative power
also vested in "inveterate sneer pests?" And is there a
difference? Furthermore, if the legislative power is vested in an
"enervate peeress stint," does this affect the Constitution's bar
on titles of nobility?
Federalism. The Tenth Amendment reserves the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution or prohibited
to it by the states to the "States respectively," or to the people.
The classic argument for this arrangement is that it allows the
states to serve as laboratories for experiment.83 But would our
82. See, e.g., Steiker et al., supra note 22, at 253-57 (taking three authors to make
the same point.)
83. See, e.g. , New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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views change if we realized that these words also suggest that the
states can be "pacesetters evil sty?" And do we have to keep
capitalizing the word "States?" Are they really that insecure?
Separation of Powers. Some have suggested that the scope
of inherent executive authority reserves to the President
substantial power to act in times of war or emergency, in ways
that would seem to violate the settled terms of the Constitution,
and despite any efforts to restrain the President by the members
of the coequal Legislative Branch of the federal government.84
As an intra-intra-textualist matter, does it present a problem that
the phrase "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed," in Article II, Section two of the Constitution, cannot
be Boggled to spell out the names "Yoo," "Addington," or
"Clarence?"
Guaranty Clause. Article IV, Section four guarantees to
every state a "Republican" form of government. (Every state,
mind you; not just South Carolina.) Does this form of
government include "panic," "rapine," "bile," "earl [s ]," and
legislatures that would seek to "ban cruel pi?"85
Signatures. To date, not much interpretive meaning has
been squeezed out of the names of the signatories to the
Constitution. What wealth of interpretive meaning could intra
intra-textualism wring from this last remaining source of work
for eager constitutional theorists? Is it a mere accident that
"Cotesworth Pinckney" can be reassembled as "concrete pithy
wonks," or "choices went krypton?"
Individual Rights. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the
infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." Does that include
such terrible penalties as "undue slurs," "unclad luaus"
(wouldn't that be awful! ), "lunar dances," and "dull saunas?" Or
are these harsh measures only forbidden if they are not part of
84. See, e.g. , Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579-99 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the President's executive authority during wartime extends to
everything and everyone except owners of mobile homes).
85. This last one is not far from the truth. See Cecil Adams, Did a State Legislature
Once Pass a Law Saying Pi Equals 3, THE STRAIGHT DOPE, Feb. 22, 1991, available at
http://www. straightdope .com/columns/read/805Idid-a-state-legislature-once-pass-a-lawsaying-pi-equals-3 (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (discussing the history of a proposed
Indiana state law that would have assigned various possible values to pi, none of which
were the actual value of pi). The bill was, among other things, sent to the House
Committee on Swamp Lands and the Senate Committee on Temperance before dying a
quiet death after being ridiculed by a math professor from Purdue "who happened to be
passing through." This is why proposals to make the Guarantee Clause justiciable, see,
e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 849 (1994), are so urgent.
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an execution -in which case, according to the current Court,
anything goes?
CONCLUSION
As should be clear by now, I could go on. This Essay
notwithstanding, however, less is often more.86 (Although,
strictly speaking, less is also less. Go figure.)
It should be enough to observe that Our Boggling
Constitution is as rich with meaning as it is rich with
implausibility. It offers questions that could easily fuel AALS
conferences for the next decade, only with people other than
close relatives actually showing up for the panels. If music, as a
wise writer once observed,87 be the food of love, intra-intra
textualism could well promise to be the tasty breakfast bar of
legal scholarship. Jefferson once wrote that "the earth belongs in
usufruct to the living."88 As a constitutional law professor, I got a
C in property, so I'm not quite sure what he was getting at. But I
think he meant that the Constitution itself, ultimately, is that
nutritious treat, waiting only to be scrambled and rearranged so
it can reveal all its secrets.
We have tried the best that constitutional theory has to
offer us -textualism, originalism, intra-textualism, living
constitutionalism, the I Ching,89 and so on. At best, they have
given us Frank Michelman and John McGinnis. At worst, they
have given us . . . Frank Michelman and John McGinnis. We
have, in short, tried the best. Isn't it time we tried the rest?
Surely it is time for all constitutional scholars to say what our
students have been telling us for years: Go ahead, Boggle me.

86. But see sources cited supra note 25 (pointing out that more can also be less).
87. I'm not sure which one. Unfortunately, my law school's Westlaw contract does
not allow me to search the Early Elizabethan Literature database.
88. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: POLITICAL WRITINGS 593, 593 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999).
89. See JACK M. BALKIN, THE LAWS OF CHANGE: I CHING AND THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LIFE (2002). Not having read it, I am unaware of whether Balkin's book actually
relates the I Ching to constitutional interpretation, but no piece on tendentious theories
of constitutional interpretation would be complete without mentioning Balkin again.

